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Abstract
Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many
governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling
governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of
procedures for decision making by these administrative bodies, including rules
about transparency and public participation. It also encompasses oversight
practices provided by legislatures, courts, and elected executives. The way
that administrative law affects the behavior of government officials holds
important implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles as well as
effective governance in society. This paper highlights salient political theory
and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative state but with
relevance to the design and application of administrative law in any
jurisdiction.

Keywords
Administrative agencies, administrative process, benefit-cost analysis, courts,
delegation, democracy, governance, government, judicial review, oversight,
procedure, regulation, regulatory impact analysis

Prepared for James D. Wright, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social &
Behavioral Sciences, 2d ed. (2015).

1

Administrative Law: The U.S. and Beyond
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania
Administrative law refers to the body of rules and procedures affecting
government agencies as they implement legislation and administer public
programs. Yet it is also much more than just rules and procedures.
Administrative law applies to the ongoing operation of government bodies and
seeks to shape official decisions that impact businesses and citizens
throughout society. These decisions include granting licenses, dispensing
government benefits, conducting inspections and investigations, imposing
sanctions, issuing orders, awarding contracts, collecting information, hiring
employees, and even making still further rules and regulations that apply to
both governmental and private actors. Administrative law affects all of these
varied decisions and addresses fundamental questions about how government
authority can and ought to be exercised. It implicates society’s most deepseated political and moral values: democracy, equity, efficiency, privacy,
transparency, and justice. And it does so by intervening in complex and
diverse organizational environments within which public and private actors
face varied, often shifting, motivations, incentives, and constraints. A proper
study of administrative law therefore requires immersion in a wide breadth of
issues in social science: normative as well as positive political theory;
individual as well as organizational behavior; and law as well as politics,
sociology, public administration, and economics.
Even when it is just considered as a body of rules, administrative law is
complex. It draws its legal pedigree from a variety of sources: constitutional
law, statutory law, internal policy, and, in some countries, common law.
Government agencies’ organizational structures and routines are shaped by
provisions derived from both generic procedural statutes (such as, in the US,
the Administrative Procedure Act) and statutes addressing specific substantive
policy issues such as energy, education, taxation, or welfare benefits. This
array of legal sources means that administrative rules and procedures can vary
significantly across agencies and, even within the same agency, across
discrete policy issues or types of actions.
The social science study of administrative law seeks to make sense of
the complexity of administrative law and how it shapes, and is shaped by, the
organizational environments within which it operates. Research has proceeded
not only to test theoretical propositions about whether and how legal norms
and institutions influence administrative behavior but also to identify and help
solve applied problems. Administrative law research is characterized in part
by prescriptive efforts to design rules that better promote political and social
values, and in part by empirical efforts to explain how law influences the
behavior of government agencies. Government agencies often possess
considerable policy discretion but are staffed by unelected officials, so a key
objective for administrative law scholars has been to understand how agency
officials are, or can be, held democratically accountable (Lodge and Stirton,
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2010). Administrative law places particular emphasis on the empirical
understanding of the impact of courts and other oversight bodies – as these
entities purport to hold administrators accountable to elected officials and the
publics they represent. Although administrative law scholarship has a rich and
important tradition of doctrinal analysis, the insights and methods of social
science have become essential for understanding how administrative law and
legal institutions can affect democratic governance. By drawing on social
science methods to understand how legal rules and institutions affect
governance, administrative law scholarship aspires both to inform and to
improve the outcomes of public institutions.
Administrative Law and Democracy
Administrative agencies make decisions affecting citizens’ lives and
entire industries – but these agencies are usually staffed by officials who are
neither elected nor otherwise directly accountable to the public. A
fundamental challenge in both positive and prescriptive scholarship has been
to analyze administrative decision making from the standpoint of democracy.
This challenge is particularly pronounced in constitutional systems with
executive bodies that are formally separate from the legislature and where
political party control can be divided between the branches of government, as
in the US. But the general challenge applies anywhere because of the
enormous discretion afforded to unelected administrative officials. Much
work in administrative law aims either to justify administrative procedures in
democratic terms or to analyze empirically how those procedures can
effectuate democratic values.
A common way to reconcile decision making by unelected
administrators with democratic principles has been to consider administrators
as mere implementers of decisions made through a democratic legislative
process. Under what is sometimes called the ‘transmission belt’ model of
administrative law, administrators are treated as mere instruments used to
implement the will of the democratically controlled legislature (Stewart,
1975). Statutes serve as the ‘transmission belt’ to the agency, both transferring
democratic authority to administrative actors and constraining those actors so
that they advance legislatively approved goals.
As a positive matter, the ‘transmission belt’ model underestimates the
amount of discretion held by administrative officials. Statutes are seldom selfexecuting. They need interpretation and must be applied in myriad concrete
circumstances. In interpreting and applying statutes, administrators assume
discretion. Statutes do not always speak clearly to the varied circumstances
that confront administrators. Not only are many of these circumstances
unanticipated by legislators, but elected officials often may lack incentives for
making laws clear or precise in the first place, as it can be to their electoral
advantage to appear to have addressed vexing social problems only in fact to
have passed difficult policy questions and tradeoffs along to unelected
administrators. For some administrative tasks, particularly monitoring and
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enforcing laws, legislators give administrators explicit discretion over how to
allocate their agencies’ resources to pursue broad legislative goals.
Scholars disagree about how much discretion legislators ought to allow
administrative agencies to exercise. Minimalists, emphasizing the electoral
accountability of the legislature, have urged that any legislative delegations of
authority to agencies be narrowly constructed (Lowi, 1979). Those scholars of
a more expansionist bent emphasize administrators’ indirect accountability to
elected officials and contend that legislatures themselves are not perfectly
representative, especially when key decisions are delegated internally to
committees and legislative staff (Mashaw, 1985). While the optimal amount
of authority to be delegated to agencies remains a subject of analysis
(Stephenson, 2008), in practice administrative agencies continue to possess
considerable discretion, even under relatively restrictive delegations.
Given that agencies do possess discretion, one aim of administrative law
has been to identify procedures that encourage administrators to exercise their
discretion in ways that promote both procedural and substantive values. A
leading approach has been to design administrative procedures to promote
broad public participation, including representation of a wide array of interest
groups (Stewart, 1975). Transparent procedures and opportunities for public
input give organized interests and ordinary citizens an ability to represent their
views in the administrative process. Such procedures include those providing
for open meetings, access to government information, hearings, and
opportunities for public comment, and the ability to petition the government.
Transparency and participation requirements are defended not only on the
grounds of procedural fairness, but also because they are expected to deliver
more information to administrators before they make decisions. These
procedures may also protect against regulatory capture – the much-decried
predicament where an agency’s decisions come to promote an industry’s
private interests to the exclusion of the broader public interest (Stigler, 1971).
Although certain requirements, such as the notice-and-comment
procedure followed by US agencies when making rules, provide the public
with the opportunity to participate in administrative decision making, this
does not necessarily mean that any extensive or representative portion of the
public actually participates in administrative policymaking. Nor does it mean
that public participation has any significant impact on agency decisions. In the
US experience, most agency rulemaking proceedings garner only a small
number of comments – and in most rulemakings by far the largest number of
these are submitted by businesses or other organized groups rather than by
what might be considered ordinary members of the public (Coglianese, 2006).
On occasion, however, agencies will issue high-salience rules that do garner
thousands of comments – typically short, unsophisticated expressions of
preferences rather than comments conveying substantive information.
As to whether comments, simple or sophisticated, make a difference, the
answer appears to be at most ‘sometimes.’ Studies find varying degrees of
association between arguments presented in comments and changes made to
proposed rules (West, 2004; Yackee, 2005; Shapiro, 2008). Formal comments,
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though, are submitted only after agencies have invested much staff time in
developing their proposed rules, a point at which much analysis and decision
making has already been completed. For this reason, representatives of
organized interest groups often seek to influence administrative policy by
making informal contact with officials well before the agency proposes a rule
and invites formal public comments (Furlong and Kerwin, 2005). Interest
group representatives may also continue to remain involved with the agency
after a ‘final’ decision has been made. Whether through litigation or further
discussions, agencies can be persuaded to issue amendments or make other
policy changes to otherwise final rules (Coglianese, 1996; West and Raso,
2012).
The widespread use of the Internet has generated interest in so-called erulemaking, or the use of information technology to connect the public more
closely with the work of administrative agencies. The advent of agency web
sites has put much more extensive information about administrative matters at
the fingertips of users around the world (provided, of course, individuals can
easily navigate through all the extraneous information also taking up space on
agency web sites) (Coglianese, 2013). Agencies now routinely accept public
comments submitted by email, and many also have a presence on social media
sites like Facebook and Twitter (Coglianese, 2013). In the US, the federal
government has created a one-stop web site called Regulations.Gov which
indexes agency regulatory proceedings, houses supporting documents and
previously submitted public comments related to new rules, and provides a
button for users to submit comments on proposed rules. Although many early
advocates of e-rulemaking heralded technology’s promise to expand public
participation in the regulatory process, to date it appears that the patterns of
commenting on agency rulemaking remain largely unchanged (Balla and
Daniels, 2007).
It should not be surprising that levels of public participation in
rulemaking remain relatively low, as the subject matter of much
administrative action remains high in complexity or low in salience – or both.
However, technology has undoubtedly made it easier for elites inside and
outside of government to monitor what agencies are doing, as well as for
scholars of administrative law to study more systematically how
administrative rules and procedures may better serve democratic principles.
Courts and Judicial Review
Concern about democracy also undergirds administrative law’s emphasis
on judicial review of government action. Under well-accepted legal principles,
courts serve as key enforcers both of the substantive laws that government
officials are charged with implementing as well as the procedural
requirements that these same officials must follow in their implementation of
substantive laws. Courts have also imposed their own additional procedures
on administrators based on constitutional and sometimes common law
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principles. A key normative question has centered on how aggressive courts
should be when it comes to reviewing the actions of administrative agencies.
Administrative agencies typically possess a greater capacity for making
sound technical and policy judgments than do courts. Even in legal systems
with specialized administrative courts, not only do agency officials and their
staffs possess greater policy expertise than judges but administrators are also
often more closely connected to democratic institutions than judges. These
considerations have long weighed in favor of judicial deference to
administrative agencies, lest judges disregard either the technical expertise or
the political legitimacy reflected in many administrative decisions. On the
other hand, it is also generally believed that some credible oversight by the
courts bolsters agencies’ compliance with administrative law and may
improve their overall performance. The prescriptive challenge has been to
identify the appropriate degree of deference for courts to give to agencies
overseeing their decision making.
Sometimes the degree of deference is said to depend on whether
agencies are making factual, policy judgments as opposed to making
judgments about the meaning of the law. Courts might have grounds for
giving more deference to agencies’ policy judgments, simply ensuring that
they have followed transparent procedures. Yet courts have also been known
to take a careful look at policy decisions to see that they are based on a
thorough analysis of all relevant issues. The latter approach is sometimes
referred to as ‘hard look’ review in the US, as it calls for judges to probe
carefully into the agency’s reasoning to ensure that agency officials conducted
a thorough analysis of policy options before reaching a decision. Although
one might suspect courts would give less deference to agencies’ legal
interpretations than to their factual judgments, especially when agencies must
interpret their own governing legislation, one of the most widely cited US
Supreme Court opinions calls upon courts to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous provisions within the statutes they implement (Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1984). Prescriptive scholarship seeks to provide
analytic guidance for judges on the appropriate level of deference that they
should give to both legal and policy choices made by agencies (Zaring, 2010).
The proliferation of prescriptive doctrinal principles in contemporary
legal systems gives rise to the question of what impact administrative law has
on the actual decision making of judges in deciding cases. After the US
Supreme Court issued its Chevron decision, lower courts reportedly shifted to
deferring more to agency interpretations (Schuck and Elliott, 1990). Yet legal
principles, whether articulated by the Supreme Court or reflected in laws
adopted by the legislature, are only one factor that may explain how judges
make their decisions. Just as administrators themselves possess residual
discretion, so too do judges possess discretion in deciding how deferential to
be to administrative agencies’ policy and legal determinations. As in other
areas of law, political ideology also may help explain patterns of judicial
decision making in administrative law cases (Revesz, 1997; Miles and
Sunstein, 2006).
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In addition to analyzing judicial decision making, the field of
administrative law has been centrally concerned with the impact of judicial
review on the behavior of officials within administrative agencies. Normative
arguments about judicial review typically depend on empirical assumptions
about the effects courts have on the behavior of administrative agencies.
Indeed, much legal scholarship in administrative law builds on the premise
that judicial review, if deployed properly, can improve governance (Edley,
1990). The effects often attributed to judicial review include making agencies
more observant of legislative mandates, increasing the analytic quality of
agency decision making, and promoting agency responsiveness to a wide
range of interests. Administrators who know that their actions may be
subjected to review by the courts can be expected to exercise greater overall
care, presumably making better, fairer, and more responsive decisions than
administrators who are insulated from direct oversight.
Notwithstanding these purported beneficial effects from judicial review,
scholars have also emphasized courts’ potentially debilitating effects on
agencies. They have widely accepted, for example, that administrators in the
US confront a high probability that their actions will be subject to litigation.
Cross-national research suggests that courts figure more prominently in
government administration in the US than in other countries (Kagan, 2003).
The threat of judicial review purportedly creates significant delays for
agencies seeking to develop regulations (McGarity, 1992).
In some cases, agencies have been said to have retreated altogether from
efforts to establish regulations. The US National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is usually cited as the clearest case of this so-called
ossification effect, with one major study suggesting that NHTSA has shifted
away from developing new auto safety standards in order to avoid judicial
reversal (Mashaw and Harfst, 1990). Other research, however, indicates that
the threat of judicial interference in agency decision making has been
significantly overestimated. Litigation challenging administrative action in the
United States occurs less frequently than is generally assumed (Coglianese,
1997), and some research indicates that agencies can surmount seemingly
adverse judicial decisions to achieve their policy objectives (Jordan, 2000).
Large-sample studies have failed to confirm the view that judicial review
significantly obstructs the rulemaking process in the United States
(O’Connell, 2008; Yackee and Yackee, 2010).
Concern over excessive adversarialism in the administrative process
persists in many countries. Government decision makers have at times
pursued collaborative or consensus-based processes as alternative strategies
for creating and implementing administrative policies. In the US, an
innovation called negotiated rulemaking has been used by some
administrative agencies in an effort to prevent subsequent litigation. In a
negotiated rulemaking, representatives from government, business, and
nongovernmental organizations work toward agreement on proposed
administrative policies (Harter, 1982). In practice, however, these agreements
have not reduced subsequent litigation, in part because litigation in the US
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over agency rules has ordinarily occurred much less frequently than generally
assumed (Coglianese, 1997). Moreover, even countries with more consensual,
corporatist policy structures experience litigation over administrative issues,
often because lawsuits can help outside groups penetrate close-knit policy
networks (Sellers, 1995). In pluralist systems such as the US, litigation is
typically viewed as a normal part of the policy process, and insiders to
administrative processes tend to go to court at least as often as outsiders
(Coglianese, 1996).
Overall, the impact of the judiciary on administrative governance has
been and will remain a staple issue for administrative law. Empirical research
on the meaning and impact of litigation in an administrative setting has the
potential for informing prescriptive efforts to craft judicial principles or
redesign administrative procedures in ways that contribute to more effective
and legitimate governance.
Legislative and Executive Oversight
In addition to the judiciary, other governmental institutions oversee the
work of government agencies and may have a significant impact on
administrative governance. In the US, given its system of separate branches of
government, administrative agencies find themselves on the receiving end of
pressure from both legislative and executive officials. Much empirical
scholarship on administrative law has investigated oversight mechanisms and
how they affect behavior within administrative agencies.
An influential political economy theory treats the procedures imposed by
legislative and executive overseers as mechanisms of control deployed to
influence agency outcomes (McCubbins et al., 1987). According to this
approach, administrative law addresses the inherent principal–agent problem
confronting elected officials when they delegate power to unelected
administrators. Administrators inevitably face incentives to implement statutes
in ways that may stray from the goals intended by the coalition that enacted
the legislation. Yet it is difficult for legislators and others to monitor agencies
continually and, in any case, a law’s original enactors do not remain in power
forever. Elected officials therefore have good reason to create administrative
procedures with the goal of entrenching the outcomes desired by the original
coalition. Empirical research, however, suggests that administrative
procedures provide at best only limited tools for locking in the enacting
coalitions’ preferences (Balla, 1998). Agencies may be less faithful to the
enacting coalition’s interests because they are more responsive to the politics
of the moment than their institutional independence might suggest. Some
analysis suggests that agencies are actually better reflective of current public
preferences than are legislatures or elected executives (Stephenson, 2008).
An overarching question in research on legislative and executive
oversight is whether officials from either legislative or executive bodies exert
the greater degree of influence over administrative agencies. One school of
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thought posits legislative dominance in the oversight of US agencies, whether
through the legislation they adopt, their control of agency budgets, or their
ability to hold hearings or launch investigations (Weingast and Moran, 1983).
Another school of thought holds that presidents exert more influence, whether
through their powers to appoint the heads of agencies, direct agencies to
comply with internal management and analytical requirements, or take the
leading role in negotiations over agency budgets (Moe and Wilson, 1994).
Given that agencies operate in a complicated political environment in which
they are subject to multiple institutional constraints and pressures from both
legislators and executive officials, the existing evidence seems to provide
support for both schools of thought. It is clear, in other words, that both
presidents and legislative officials exert influence over agencies, even if
neither exercises complete control over administrative action.
One way legislatures have sought to influence agencies has been to try
to direct their policymaking agendas. Not only can a legislature shape the
direction of an agency by how it structures its delegation of substantive
authority, but a legislature can also exert influence on the timing of
administrative action. Statutes can contain deadlines for agency action,
imposing a legal obligation on agencies to develop implementing rules by a
specified time. Only a minority – perhaps even only a small fraction – of all
regulations in the US are established under the stricture of a statutory deadline
(West and Raso, 2012; Gersen and O’Connell, 2007). However, the legislature
still prompts the initiation of many more administrative regulatory
proceedings in the US than do executive branch officials or the courts (West
and Raso, 2012). The imposition of deadlines also appears to speed up the
regulatory process, at least modestly (Gersen and O’Connell, 2007).
Once an administrative agency decides to initiate a regulatory
proceeding, in many jurisdictions the agency must conduct a regulatory
impact analysis that will be reviewed by either a legislative or executive
branch oversight body (Wiener, 2013; Radaelli and de Francesco, 2010). In
the US, every president since Ronald Reagan has imposed a requirement that
agencies develop regulatory impact analyses for their most significant
administrative rules. Such mandated analyses must be reviewed by a White
House office called the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
an oversight body that has been extensively debated by administrative law
scholars. The dominant theory is that presidents use the OIRA oversight
process to coordinate regulatory priorities and resolve the principal–agent
problem that exists between the president and those appointees the president
selects to head regulatory agencies. As a normative matter, proponents of
legislative supremacy decry the encroachment of presidents on the work of
agencies that possess authority delegated to them by statute. Presidentialists,
on the other hand, favor OIRA review as it offers a mechanism for the one
official elected in a nationwide election to oversee the ongoing work of
dozens of agencies that issue hundreds of important rules every year. OIRA
oversight, based as it is on economic analyses that agencies prepare, has also
triggered normative debate over the use of benefit–cost analysis in
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administrative policymaking. Advocates claim that benefit–cost analysis helps
improve regulatory policy, while opponents claim it only obfuscates decision
making and delays much needed rules. Concern also exists that business
interests use the OIRA process as a backdoor means of influencing regulatory
policy to the detriment of achieving statutory goals or advancing the overall
public interest.
Empirical researchers have been motivated by the normative debate over
the OIRA process. They have documented that modern presidents have indeed
sought to use OIRA review to achieve goals consistent with their policy
priorities, even if these may not always comport with the results of benefit–
cost analysis (Shapiro, 2005). Researchers have also shown that, in practice,
OIRA review manifests itself differently across different administrations,
especially in the degree to which interactions between White House and
agency staff are cooperative or adversarial (West, 2006; Croley, 2003).
Notwithstanding OIRA’s prominence, agency staff members continue to
report that they retain considerable discretion in framing and making many
regulatory policy decisions, even ones formally subject to OIRA scrutiny
(Bressman and Vandenbergh, 2006). Furthermore, the economic analysis
produced as part of the OIRA review process appears to have much less
impact on decision making than many advocates of benefit–cost analysis have
hoped (Hahn and Tetlock, 2008) – but also much less of an impact in terms of
delaying regulatory output as opponents of such analysis have feared
(Coglianese, 2008).
Administrative policymaking occurs within a complex political and legal
environment, one in which legislatures and high-level executive officials
clearly play important roles. However, even major oversight entities do not
possess the high degree of control that their proponents desire or their critics
fear. An ongoing challenge for administrative law research remains to explain
better the precise effects of legislative and executive oversight under varied
conditions.
Administrative Law and Governance
Administrative law lies at several intersections, crossing the boundaries
of law and politics, political theory and political science, public law, and
public administration. As the body of law governing governments, the future
of administrative law rests in expanding knowledge about how law and legal
institutions can advance core political and social values. A concern with
democratic principles will continue to dominate research in administrative
law, as will interest in the role of judicial, legislative, and executive oversight
in improving administrative governance. Yet administrative law can and
should expand to meet new roles that government will face in the future.
Ongoing efforts at deregulation and privatization may signal a renegotiation of
the divisions between the public and private sectors in many countries, the
results of which will undoubtedly have implications for administrative law.
Administrative law also now functions in an increasingly globalized and
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digital world, with the emerging application of both international
administrative institutions and new uses of technology that might advance
both public legitimacy and policy effectiveness – or that might undermine or
support administrative law institutions. No matter where the specific
challenges may lie in the future, social science research on administrative law
will continue to be needed to understand the operation of governmental
institutions and identify ways to design rules and procedures that can
potentially increase social welfare, promote the fair treatment of individuals,
and expand the potential for transparent and democratic governance.
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